UN Special N° 652 Juin · June 2006 

A Judgement of Janus

André Heitz, WIPO

It is a welcome coincidence that we can report on Judgement No. 1275 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (delivered on 23 November 2005, notified on 31 January 2006) at a time when a “Redesign Panel” is considering the UN’s administration of justice system. The judgement, the facts behind it and the procedure that lead to it indeed illustrate some of the glaring deficiencies which afflict the system. I mean: the United Nations organisation as a whole.

Two-faced Janus

The Facts
The facts are very simple. Mr. Raed Al Souki, a Lebanese national, held a one-year fixedterm contract in the UNDP Office in Abu Dhabi. On 27 June 2000, three high-level representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into the Office, pointed their fingers to five General Service Officials and requested their immediate replacement by nationals as well as, by the way, the cancellation of the new salary scale resulting from a salary survey conducted three months earlier. You may feel this description is
romanticized. If at all, it is only slightly.
The matter was referred to Headquarters. Nothing happened; I mean: nothing effective. Four out of the five officials accepted the termination indemnities, and the fifth appealed upon termination, on 31 October 2000, of a one-month extension granted in order to fill the gap pending entry into service of his Emirati replacement. The problem having been drawn to the attention of the Federation of International Civil Servants’ Associations (FICSA), it was picked up by its General Secretary of that time, that is – self-congratulation rarely hurts– your not-so-humble servant.

An Astute Joint Appeals Board (JAB)
Mr. Al Souki wrote to the Secretary-General on 3 October 2000 to request a review of the administrative decision not to renew his contract beyond 31 October. He was told by letter of 16 October 2000 that there was no justification for rescinding the impugned decision. He lodged an appeal on 22 January 2001 and the JAB delivered its conclusions and recommendations… three years later, almost to the day.
We shall never know who the culprit for this inordinate delay is. But we know for sure that the JAB did a remarkable job in analyzing the facts and drawing the legal conclusions. It “unanimously recommended that the Appellant be awarded three months’ net base salary as compensation for the prejudice sustained as a result of UNDP’s impropriety.

The Bright Side of Janus
Under circumstances that will be broached upon below, the case went a step higher, to the Tribunal. But, let us quickly go back to the time frame: counted from the date of the JAB report, the case took another two years. That is not so bright.
The Tribunal relied very heavily on the JAB’s factual and legal analysis.“The Tribunal concurs with the findings of the JAB on these matters” is a phrase which encapsulates the Tribunal’s mindset. But it did not concur with the evaluation of the compensation and ordered payment of an additional nine months’ net base salary, essentially to compensate for the Respondent’s failure to “act with appropriate care and diligence in this matter” and the excessive delay in the JAB procedure leading to a violation of the rights to due process.
The relief fell short of what was requested, but, fair enough: the Tribunal exercised its discretion and judgement within the set limits.
The Tribunal also used strong language, particularly at X:
The record makes clear that the UAE Government specifically directed the hiring and termination of staff members in the UNDP Office in Abu Dhabi based solely on their national origin […] The Tribunal concludes that UNDP’s implementation of such directions was a clear violation of international law, the United Nations Charter, the Basic Agreement between the UAE Government and UNDP, as well as a violation of the Staff Regulations and Rules. By allowing the UAE Government to interfere in personnel decisions such as those involving the Applicant, UNDP abdicated its duty not to allow outside forces, including Member States, to make such decisions.

The Dark Side of Janus
Yet there is every reason to be – let us use the language favoured by lawyers and diplomats – disappointed. The hint for this is already in the above quotation: the violated instruments are listed in descending order of importance!
After some window-dressing in the form of a reminder on its case law on ancillary matters, the Tribunal went on saying that “As the Respondent has violated his own rules, the Applicant is entitled to compensation” (our emphasis). Hocus pocus, and a violation of the Charter becomes a minor offense!
Worse, the Tribunal opined (at XI) that “[i]n reaching its decision, the Tribunal is not unmindful of the inherent complexities that UNDP faces with Member States in matters such as these. Member States, because they are contributors to the budget of UNDP, may consider they are entitled to pressure UNDP in respect of personnel and budget decisions […]
In other words, the Tribunal built an automatic attenuating circumstance into Article 100.1 of the Charter, which reads in part: “In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organization”. The same applies to Article 100.2, “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities”. Thus, in the final analysis, the Tribunal defeated the very purpose of Article 100 of the Charter.
Ironically, the Tribunal states, at XIII, that “[j]ust as staff members are expected to conduct themselves with the highest level of integrity and professionalism, so too must the Administration be held to comparable standards”.

Comparable Standards?
The Tribunal’s leniency towards UNDP and the United Nations Secretariat is surprising. As regards the latter, despite the official documents– the correspondence from the UNDP senior officers in Abu Dhabi, a letter by the Director of the UNDP’s Office of Human Resources, the Notes verbales from the Emirati Government, the FICSA written interventions – the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs claimed before the JAB that the non-renewal of the contract “was due to the staff reduction exercise undertaken by UNDP Headquarters” (quoted from the JAB report). In plain words, this is a deliberate attempt to mislead (there is a shorter word for this!). The JAB concluded in measured language:“The Panel found the Respondent’s argument disingenuous and misleading”.
The Tribunal subsequently concurred, but did not go further, either in respect of the UNDP leadership or the United Nations legal services.
On other occasions, notably in Judgement No. 914 (Gordon and Pelanne), the Tribunal felt “compelled to add that this is such a case of maladministration that consideration should be given to invoking staff rule 112.3…” (the provisions on financial responsibility and the obligation for staff members to reimburse the United Nations in certain cases). In this case, obviously, it did not feel so compelled. This begs the question: why?
This was not just a case pitting a (former) staff member against an (anonymous) Administration. It was one in which the overarching Staff Federation FICSA made repeated calls for a solution – insisting on the violation of Articles 100 and 101 of the United Nations Charter and the need to preserve both the interests of Mr. Al Souki and “the image and credibility of UNDP in particular and the United Nations in general” (quoted in the JAB report). An urgent request to find a solution had also been made to the UNDP Administrator in person by the FICSA President and General Secretary in an eye-to-eye meeting with him, at a time when the issue was still “hot” (on 3 November 2000; Mr. Al Souki’s contract had ended three days before). The JAB “agreed with the Appellant that the UNDP Administrator, despite all attempts made by the Appellant as well as FICSA, failed to address the matter appropriately”. So again, why?

Careless and Contemptuous Segments of Administration
The above is eloquent enough on the attitude of the UNDP Administrator – we won’t say “Administration” for some senior officials have attempted to discharge their duties with honour – and the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs.
Furthermore, the Secretary-General makes it a point to report to the General Assembly that, save special case, he accepts the JAB reports that have been accepted unanimously. However, in this case (or is it in all or most cases?), whilst he had thirty days as per article 7.2(b) of the Statute of the Tribunal to say a simple “yes”, the letter embodying the “yes” was only issued on 29 July 2004, that is, on the eve of the summer break… And, the letter having gone astray without anyone caring to follow the matter closely, Mr.Al Souki only became aware of it on 11 October 2004.
This, again, begs a question. The Application to the Tribunal was filed on 28 May 2004. Of course, it had already been notified to the United Nations when the letter was drafted; in actual fact, the Office of Legal Affairs had requested an extension of its time limit for the Reply on 24 June. So, was the letter a genuine decision of the Secretary-General, or an attempt to defuse a case that could have devastating consequences on “the image and credibility of UNDP in particular and the United Nations in general” (see above)?
Well, in the light of the incidents described below, we simply cannot exclude the second term of the alternative.
Back to some more trivial issues. The United Nations Office of Legal Affairs has requested several further extensions of its time limit for the submission of its Reply to the Tribunal. The last one was filed on the very last day of the period allowed, without any statement of reasons, making it close to impossible to the Tribunal to refuse to grant the extension. This, in plain language, is contempt for Court. But the Tribunal did not pick it up.

«...We won’t claim that the UN suffer
from class justice. But they suffer
without doubt from a widespread
perception that there is class justice,
or no justice at all...»

A Tribunal Secretariat Under Influence?
How did Mr. Al Souki find out about the Secretary-General’s acceptance of the JAB recommendation? Because he received the following Email from the Tribunal Secretariat on 11 October 2004: “We have been advised by the Respondent that the Secretary-General has accepted the favorable recommendations from the JAB in your case. I assume that you have received a letter to this effect. In view of that decision, please advise us as to whether you wish to withdraw your Application.” (Our emphasis).
Prior to that, upon the filing of the Application, the Secretariat tried to have it withdrawn on the ground that it was premature, the
Secretary-General always following up on JAB reports. Needless to say that this was in utter disregard of the strict rules on time limits set out in Article 7 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
So we titillated the Tribunal Secretariat on this and – please note: Article 7 of the Statute of the Tribunal contemplates the case where there is no decision of the Secretary-General on a JAB report – we were told in a letter of 28 June 2004 that “[t]he decision of the Secretary-General is an absolute necessity […] as applications are not filed against the JAB’s recommendations, but the Secretary-General’s decision thereon”.
One can only speculate over the reasons for such extravagancies. We thought for a while that it was incompetence, if not stupidity; this was not charitable indeed. Then a colleague of ours knowing the protagonists ventured that all this might have happened upon instruction; this is even less charitable.
This, in all fairness to the Tribunal, was not brought to its attention. It should be, however, to the Redesign Panel.

La Fontaine’s Fable
The Animals Stricken of the Plague In Gordon and Pelanne, the “culprit” – oh! The case was about procedural irregularities in the filling of two D-1 posts – was U.N. Assistant Secretary-General Dennis Halliday. At the time of the judgement, he had already resigned from his post of Humanitarian Aid Co-ordinator for Irak in protest over the situation created by the U.S. driven U.N. sanctions. So, in United Nations terms, he was at best one Mr. Nobody. Now, in Al Souki, the Administrator of UNDP was Mr. … And when the case was being considered by the Tribunal, he had moved to the United Nations as … And, by the time this article is published, he will be…

«Selon que vous serez puissant ou misérable,
Les jugements de cour vous rendront blanc ou noir.»

 
“Thus human courts acquit the strong,
And doom the weak, as therefore wrong.”

In Conclusion, Dear Redesign Panel and Colleagues,
We won’t claim that the United Nations suffer from class justice. But they suffer without doubt from a widespread perception that there is class justice, or no justice at all.
We will affirm the right for a tribunal to get it wrong. In this instance, the JAB got it right – a shining testimony to the fact that the system can work – and the Tribunal got it right in its conclusion, but utterly wrong in the reasons.
The Administration of Justice in the United Nations suffers in our view from some systemic deficiencies (such as the obligation for the Tribunal to always specify a compensation in lieu of specific performance), and assuredly from a considerable drift away from principles and proper procedures.
Both the perception and the drift call for an aggiornamiento
…And Al Souki was not a case of violation of the Organisation’s own rules, but of the Charter. The CHARTER. The C. H. A. R. T . E. R.

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